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1 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION: 
APPLICATION TO NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
Imrana Iqbal* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
International legal responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism by 
non-state actors have been many but often inconsistent, inadequate, 
and legally unsound.  This Article argues in favor of resorting to 
successfully-implemented methods of dealing with similar crimes.  
International law has already expanded from its original statist 
conceptions and scope to include individuals, such as in 
international human rights norms and international humanitarian 
laws. In the latter, in particular, the law has expanded in the context 
of both international and non-international armed conflict.  This 
Article argues that the advancement of law in these areas can lend 
much to efforts to bring nuclear terrorism within the scope of 
International Criminal Court, from whose jurisdiction this crime is 
currently excluded.  This Article also recommends purposefully 
elevating the prohibition against possession and use of nuclear 
weapons by non-state actors to jus cogens, making such acts 
international crimes of the type that do not necessarily require state 
consent for prosecution by an international tribunal.   
 
 
 
                                                            
*Imrana Iqbal is an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland 
University College (UMUC). She teaches writing, government, law, and business. 
I am grateful to Professor Paul F. Diehl, Ashbel Smith Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Texas at Dallas, for his review of this work and 
valuable suggestions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concern that terrorists may acquire and use nuclear 
weapons predates the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States.1  The disquiet that terrorists’ activities are growing deadlier 
with time and may culminate in a nuclear terroristic catastrophe 
deepened with the terrorist violence of September 11, 2001.2  The 
fact that the international legal regime of nuclear nonproliferation, 
founded on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(“NPT” or “Treaty”),3 is inadequate and provides no reliable 
protection against the risk of nuclear terrorism by non-State actors 
has hung over humanity’s perceptual horizon even longer.4  
The preamble of the Treaty bespeaks fear of nuclear wars 
and prospects of societal benefits of atomic energy as the impetus 
for establishment of the regime.5  Accordingly, the Treaty constrains 
non-nuclear states against acquisition and control of nuclear 
weapons technology but promises them access to the technology for 
peaceful purposes.6  The NPT did not, however, succeed in freeing 
the world from the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation or create 
                                                            
1 SARA DALY ET AL., AUM SHINRIKYO, AL QAEDA, AND THE KINSHASA 
REACTOR: IMPLICATIONS OF THREE CASE STUDIES FOR COMBATING NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM, vii (2005). 
2 CHARLES D. FERGUSON & WILLIAM C. POTTER, THE FOUR FACES OF 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 14 (2005). 
3 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].  
4 Joseph F. Pilat, Dealing with Proliferation and Terrorism Involving 
WMD, in COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 9, 16–17 (Nathan E. Busch & 
Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009). 
5 NPT, supra note 3, pmbl. (establishing a global regime by dividing 
states into two categories: nuclear-weapon states, which may possess nuclear 
weapons; and nonnuclear-weapon states, which undertake not to manufacture or 
acquire nuclear weapons). 
6 NPT, supra note 3. The NPT framework forbids nuclear states to 
transfer weapons technology, id. art. I, and non-nuclear states to manufacture 
nuclear weapons and explosive devices. Id. art. II. It encourages nations to nuclear 
technology for peaceful uses, id. art. IV, but it also requires non-nuclear weapons 
states to submit to the safeguards procedures of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency against its diversion for production of nuclear weapons, id. art. III. 
3
IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/19  8:23 PM 
4 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:1 
a perception in the fairness of its provisions.7  In the post-Cold War 
world, non-nuclear weapon states have particularly clamored for 
equality in the “bargain.”8  Article VI of the NPT, the disarmament 
provision, has particularly been a contentious issue.9  Under article 
VI, the NPT binds “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty” to begin good 
faith negotiations to end nuclear arms race and effectuate nuclear 
disarmament.10  The fact that nuclear weapons states have largely 
ignored article VI has considerably weakened the perception of 
fairness of the bargain that the NPT sought to strike between nuclear 
weapons states, on the one hand, and non-nuclear weapons states, 
on the other.  Non-state actors do not figure in the NPT-based 
arrangement.11   
The question, then, arises as to whether, generally speaking, 
non-state actors figure in international law—a question of enduring 
interest and discussion among international law scholars.  More 
narrowly-focused questions are whether international law can 
                                                            
7 See Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 41, 
48 (1998) (defending India’s decision to stay outside the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, denouncing it as a system of “nuclear apartheid”). 
8 Nina Tannenwald, Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime, 27 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 299, 302 (2013). 
9 Id. (noting that the nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States, 
refused to acknowledge in the 2005 Review Conference for the NPT previously 
agreed-upon disarmament obligations); see also Wilfred Wan, Why the NPT 
Review Conference Outcome Matters, U.N. U. CTR. FOR POL’Y RES. (Mar. 10, 
2015), https://cpr.unu.edu/why-the-npt-review-conference-outcome-
matters.html. Wilfred pointed out that the failure of the parties to the Treaty to 
reach a consensus on disarmament weakens non-nuclear weapon states’ 
commitment to their side of the bargain. Id. 
10 It is unclear why this article is directed toward all parties when, clearly, 
only a few states possessed nuclear weapons at that time. In contrast, article I is 
specifically directed toward nuclear weapons states, and the two subsequent 
articles are specifically directed toward non-nuclear weapons states. See NPT, 
supra note 3, arts. I–III. 
11 It will be short-sighted to state, however, that the NPT does not at all 
limit non-State actors’ opportunities to acquire, build, or transport nuclear 
weapons or materials.  It does so, indirectly, by delimiting states’ nuclear activities 
and by seeking to make diversion of state-controlled nuclear materials detectable 
and punishable.  It does so also by seeking to crystallize the world consensus that 
nuclear weapons must not be allowed to proliferate. The NPT, however, does not 
directly reach non-State actors. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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constrain non-state actors’ activities that can potentially lead to 
nuclear terrorism and whether international law is capable of 
punishing non-state actors if they commit acts of nuclear terrorism.  
These are central questions with which this Article deals. 
Following the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the late 
1990s and the generally-perceived failure of the United Nations to 
meet the post-Cold War challenges of containing intensified inter-
state hostilities, scholars both questioned the value of the UN-
founded international legal system in creating abiding rules and 
norms and realized the ever-greater need for international laws.12  
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, scholars expressed 
dismay that the terrorists could not be prosecuted under international 
law and exhorted in favor of deliberation on holding individual 
terrorists culpable under international law through collective 
international legal action.13  
International law has been continually evolving to respond 
to new, emerging realities.14  Over time, the international legal 
regime’s primary principles of equality and justice—laid out in the 
Charter of the United Nations15—have come to be encoded in 
various multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the 
                                                            
12 Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl, International Law as Operating and 
Normative Systems: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND 
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 1 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 2nd ed. 2003); 
see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, YALE 
L.J. 2599, 2600–01, 2659 (1997) (Faculty Scholarship Series) (concluding that 
the processes of international law propel a “normative and constitutive dynamic” 
whereby nations interpret global norms—incorporating them into national laws—
and re-shape national interests and national identities); ABRAM CHAYES & 
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25 (1995) (arguing treaty regimes 
unfold a dynamic of compliance through “an iterative process of discourse among 
the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public”). 
13 Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 993–94, 1001 (2001).  
14 Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 2 (“International organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and even 
private individuals have come to play an increasing role in international relations, 
and accordingly international legal rules have evolved to engage these new 
actors.”).  
15 U.N. Charter pmbl., ¶ 1. 
5
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United Nations.  Of particular interest to this Article are the treaties 
that enshrine humanitarian laws, such as the Geneva Treaties and 
their Additional Protocols.  Those laws, applicable to state and non-
state actors, in international and non-international armed conflicts, 
are legal representation of norms that the U.N. principles helped to 
emerge.16  This Article postulates that international law is capable 
of advancing the same values in the area of proliferation and use of 
nuclear weapons and explosive devices by non-state actors. Those 
values can spur further evolution of international law, expanding it 
to bring nuclear terrorism within the jurisdiction of international 
law, either under the international humanitarian laws or 
international laws of nuclear non-proliferation.  While gradual 
widening of the scope of international law is patently discernable, 
this Article proposes the direction of that change.  The proposed 
modification of international law comports with a “normative 
consensus”17 emerging with regard to possession and use of nuclear 
weapons. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
A. International Legal Regime of Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 Soon after the first use of nuclear weapons by the United 
States against Japan, international community formed international 
law rules to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation among states.  
The foundational structure for the international legal regime of 
nuclear non-proliferation comprises the NPT and its supporting 
organizational arrangement of International Atomic Energy Agency 
(“IAEA”) for monitoring compliance of NPT member states with 
NPT’s provisions. 
The NPT applies directly only to states. It extracts two basic 
promises from member states: (1) that nuclear weapons states will 
                                                            
16 For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the Ku and Diehl’s argument 
that some normative elements of international law have a “legally binding 
character.” Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 12. Their broader postulation is that, in 
international law, some underlying values direct the emergence of norms and that 
some norms shape behaviors of states and other actors—as opposed to other 
norms that might exist in state interactions out of considerations of comity. Id.     
17 Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis in original).   
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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not help non-nuclear weapon states acquire nuclear weapons18 and 
(2) that non-nuclear weapon states will not acquire nuclear weapons 
and will accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) 
safeguards to ensure that their nuclear activities are undertaken only 
for peaceful purposes.19  The NPT, however, acknowledges nations’ 
right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and promises 
that countries possessing nuclear technology will share the 
technology with others for peaceful uses.20  Further, the NPT 
requires that members shall strive toward cessation of nuclear arms 
race and eventual nuclear disarmament.21   
As Sievert noted, the NPT struck a “bargain” wherein the 
signatory non-nuclear weapon nations were promised access to 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in return for a promise that 
they would desist from manufacturing nuclear weapons or 
transferring nuclear weapons-related materials and technologies.22  
As part of the bargain, the nuclear-weapons states promised to begin 
                                                            
18 NPT, supra note 3, art. I. (“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive 
devices.”). 
19 Id. art. II (“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive 
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.”). 
20 Id. art. IV, ¶ 1 (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting 
the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”). 
21 Id. art. VI (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control.”). 
22 Ronald J. Sievert, Working Toward a Legally Enforceable Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Regime, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 93, 93 (2010). 
7
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good faith negotiations on measures to stop the ongoing nuclear 
arms race and, over time, achieve nuclear disarmament.23  The NPT 
required, under Article III, non-nuclear weapons signatory states to 
submit to the IAEA inspection and verification regime to assure the 
international community that they were not diverting nuclear 
materials and technologies for belligerent purposes.  The NPT-based 
regime was amended with the Additional Protocol in 1977 to 
supplement the existing IAEA safeguards system.  The objective of 
the Additional Protocol was to tighten regulations against countries 
that, with access to nuclear materials, knowledge, and technologies 
that the NPT membership granted, could surrender to temptations to 
develop nuclear weapons.   
This whole NPT-based arrangement applied to consenting 
states that voluntarily agreed to be bound by it.  The legal rules of 
the NPT-based regime of nuclear nonproliferation have had no 
competence for controlling non-state actors’ activities.  Thus, in the 
context of possible nuclear terrorism, NPT-based international laws 
of nuclear nonproliferation are irrelevant, except to the extent that 
they seek to control states’ nuclear behaviors, such as transference 
of nuclear materials, expertise, and know-how in ways that create 
risk of nuclear weapons falling into terrorists’ hands.   
B. Perceived Effectiveness of International Legal Regime for 
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation 
The U.N. Charter does not mention “proliferation,” as the 
issue did not exist at the time the document was written.  It mentions, 
however, “disarmament,” in articles 11, 26, and 47.  In article 11(1) 
disarmament and regulation of armament appear as principles, 
among others, that signatory nations are required to follow and 
cooperate upon for maintenance of international peace and security.  
Article 26(1) holds the Security Council responsible, with assistance 
from the Military Staff Committee, for planning a system of 
regulating disarmament. Article 47(1) enjoins the Military Staff 
Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on matters 
related to regulation and possible disarmament. 
                                                            
23 Id. at 93–94.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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While under the Covenants of the League of Nations, 
disarmament had meant absence of arms,24 under the U.N. Charter, 
it came to mean arms control under international law as, by then, 
experience had taught that maintenance of a certain level of arsenal 
was necessary.25 
Soon after the writing of the U.N. Charter, the issue of 
nuclear weapons proliferation surfaced, but the Charter made no 
distinction between conventional and non-conventional weapons.  
Non-proliferation issues, therefore, fell under the general category 
of issues regarding arms control.26   
The main weakness of international laws, including 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and the one which 
renders these laws ineffectual against non-state actors, has been 
traditionally regarded as their state-centric character.27  For that 
                                                            
24 Andrew Webster, The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats 
and Soldiers in the League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 
1920–1938, 14 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 493, 493 (2005). 
25 Daniel H. Joyner, Non-proliferation Law and the United Nations 
System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power of the Security Council, 
20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 489, 491 (2007).  
26 Id. 
27 Since early in the development of international law, scholars have 
pointed out that the effectiveness of international law lies not in its power of 
enforcement of laws but in its influence in regulating international relations and 
struggle for power.  Unlike a national legal system, where the government 
exercises coercive powers over its subjects, international law lacks enforceability 
due to the consent requirement for its enforcement measures, its decentralized 
character, the imprecise nature of its obligations, the varied interpretations of law 
that nations are able to construe to suit their individual interests, and the multiple 
ways in which nations can implement the law to fit their preferences and purposes. 
It follows that an individual perpetrator of a crime like nuclear terrorism can be 
punished by the state of which the individual is subject: international law does not 
directly reach the individual—at least not as yet. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU ET 
AL., POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 293–327 
(7th ed. 1978); see also Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 419–420, 441 (1983) (discerning in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, a shift in the axis of general international 
law from states to the community of states for directing expansion of binding 
international legal rules). Bederman wrote in the early twenty-first century that 
the international legal order is still state-centered. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE 
SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2002); Ku and Diehl, supra note 12, at 2 
(noting that the scope of international law has expanded to include international 
9
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reason, with its focus on states, the NPT does not represent the 
dominant legal and political approach when significance of non-
state actors striving for dominance with nuclear weapons has 
increased.28  Former United States President Barack Obama 
conveyed this sense to the world in his 2009 speech in Prague, Czech 
Republic, in which he all but conceded to the failure of the global 
non-proliferation regime in the new context, noting “[t]errorists are 
determined to buy, build or steal [nuclear weapons].  Our efforts to 
contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation 
regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could 
reach the point where the center cannot hold.”29 
In our times, there exist ongoing concerns regarding nuclear 
terrorism.30  With little confidence that the international legal regime 
                                                            
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational 
corporations, and even private individuals). Not many international legal scholars 
would yet say, though, that individuals are direct subjects of international law. 
28 See David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: End of the Arms Control  Approach?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 39, 64 (2004) (arguing that the state-centric focus in the WMD policies are 
anachronistic with rise of the threat of WMD terrorism). 
29 Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague (Apr. 
5, 2009) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered) (indicating a 
conviction that the existing global non-proliferation system is inadequate to meet 
the threat of nuclear terrorism).  
30 The Washington Post, Nuclear Terrorism FAQ, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 
FOR SCI. & INT’L AFF. BELFER CTR. (Sept. 26, 2007), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-faq. The Harvard 
Kennedy School’s Belfer Center finds it plausible that terrorists can acquire 
nuclear weapons and commit nuclear terrorism: “Unfortunately, terrorist use of a 
nuclear bomb is a very real danger . . . Published estimates of the chance that 
terrorists will detonate a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city over the next ten years range 
from 1 percent to 50 percent. In a 2005 poll of international security experts taken 
by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the median estimate of the chance of a nuclear 
attack in the next ten years was 29 percent—and a strong majority believed that it 
was more likely that terrorists would launch a nuclear attack than that a state 
would. Given the horrifying consequences of such an attack, even a 1 percent 
chance would be enough to call for rapid action to reduce the risk.” Id.; see also 
William C. Potter, The NPT and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint, 2 AM. ACAD. 
ARTS & SCI. 68, 81 (2010) (arguing that the Treaty’s inattentiveness to non-State 
actors who have risen either as suppliers or potential end-users of nuclear 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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of nuclear nonproliferation, based on the NPT and its 
complementary verification regime under the IAEA, can reach non-
state actors,31 many scholars of nuclear terrorism express dismay: 
they are certain that terrorists will seek and use nuclear weapons to 
terrorize without impediment from international law.  Albright and 
Hinderstein, for instance, argued that the inability of the global 
nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the NPT-based system 
and the system of international export controls, to detect private 
individuals’ and groups’ clandestine nuclear activities—such as 
those of the A. Q. Khan network, which violated global 
nonproliferation objectives by large scale black market trading of 
nuclear technologies and material around the world—attests to 
inadequacy of the system.32  These scholars argue that international 
legal tools are fraught with gaps that make nuclear security 
precarious, with the possibility that terrorists may gain ability to 
acquire and use nuclear weapons.33  With heightening perception of 
the possibility of nuclear terrorism, skeptics doubted whether the 
international legal system of nuclear nonproliferation could survive 
the prevailing conditions of the twenty-first century.34  When 
scholars, such as Graham Allison, listed ways of preventing possible 
                                                            
technology, materials, and weapons is one critical challenge that the NPT faces 
and which may cause the NPT-based regime’s demise). 
31 Gilles Arbellot du Repaire, The Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and Terrorism: The Consequences of 11 September 2001 on the Treaty 
Review Process, 71 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 15, 17 (2003). 
32 David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and 
Future Proliferation Networks, 28 WASH. Q. 111, 111 (2005). 
33 Id. at 111, 113.  
34 MITCHELL B. REISS, COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: 
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY ix–xv (Nathan 
Busch & Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009) (noting the following current conditions 
that substantiate the doubt regarding efficacy of the NPT in the 21st century: 
“ongoing political and technical hurdles to corralling and safeguarding the nuclear 
materials and weapons of the former Soviet Union; concerns over the safety and 
security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal; anxieties over the spread of increasingly 
sophisticated, dual-use biotechnology capabilities; spread of medium- and long-
range missiles around the world; fears over the possible acquisition of nuclear 
weapons or radioactive materials by terrorist groups; and variegated challenges to 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspections system, and regional security by the nuclear ambitions of 
North Korea and Iran”). 
11
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nuclear terrorism attempts, they did not take into account the NPT-
based international legal regime.35  The NPT-based system was not 
designed to deal with subnational terrorism and it does not.   
C. International Attempts to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Through 
Other Legal Measures 
 
 With the rise of fear of nuclear terrorism, particularly after 
the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the international community 
scrambled to develop other measures to hinder possible attempts by 
non-state actors to acquire and use nuclear weapons.36  The 
international community has sought to close gaps in the current 
international nuclear nonproliferation laws through various 
unilateral and multilateral measures, initiatives, and proposals; the 
growing trend is to establish remedial measures and standards 
outside the NPT-based nuclear nonproliferation regime.37   
                                                            
35 See Graham Allison, How to Stop Nuclear Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 
64, 68–74 (2004). Allison concurs with President Bush’s characterization of 
nuclear terror as the “defining threat the [United States now] face[s].” Id. at 64. 
The scholar proposes a national security strategy “based on the "Three No's": no 
loose nukes, no nascent nukes, and no new nuclear states.”  Id. at 65. It is clear 
that neither the politician, President Bush, nor the scholar, Graham, considered 
international legal remedies to address the possibility of nuclear terrorism. See 
also MITCHELL B. REISS, COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 1 (Nathan Busch & 
Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009) (pointing out that the dominant method of preventing 
nuclear terrorism is state control of sensitive materials through national and 
international political and legal frameworks). States have, clearly, not considered 
remedies founded on the NPT-based international legal system to prevent the 
feared nuclear terrorism. 
36 Robert Litwk, Preventing a Nuclear 9/11: State-Based Strategies to 
Deter Non-State Threats, LAWFARE (July 30, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/preventing-nuclear-911-state-based-strategies-
deter-non-state-threats.  Litwak writes that, following 9/11, the threats of nuclear 
terrorism led to re-consideration of the two classical deterrence strategies—
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Id. The former entails 
punitive responses, and the latter seeks to block acquisition of means to conduct 
terrorism. Following 9/11, state cooperation emerged as a new, dominant 
deterrence strategy instead. 
37 See Saira Bano & Srini Sitaraman, The Nuclear Security Regime and 
Nuclear Terror, THE DIPLOMAT (May 7, 2016), 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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D. Multilateral Efforts 
The post-Cold War fears of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(“WMD”) terrorism led the United Nations General Assembly to 
establish an ad hoc committee with the mandate “to elaborate an 
international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings 
and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression 
of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing 
international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further 
developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions 
dealing with international terrorism[.]”38  The ad hoc committee’s 
work resulted in conclusion of three treaties under the auspices of 
the U.N. General Assembly: the International Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997 and entered 
into force in 2001);39 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999 and entered 
into force in 2002);40 and the International Convention on the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (adopted in 2005 and 
entered into force in 2007).41  The preamble of the International 
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
specifically states that “acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the 
gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace 
and security . . . [and] that existing multilateral legal provisions do 
not adequately address those attacks[.]”42   
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, a series of multilateral state efforts emerged to address the 
heightened fear of nuclear terrorism including: 
                                                            
https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/is-the-nuclear-security-regime-doing-enough-
to-stop-nuclear-terror/. 
38  G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 9 (Dec. 17, 1996). 
39 G.A. Res. 52/164, annex (Dec. 15, 1997); International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, 2149 U.N.T.S. 259 (entered 
into force May 23, 2001). 
40 G.A. Res. 54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999); International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 
(entered into force Apr. 10, 2002). 
41 G.A. Res. 59/290 (Apr. 13, 2005); International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Sept. 14, 2005, 2245 U.N.T.S. 89 
(entered into force July 7, 2007). 
42 Id. pmbl. 
13
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● IAEA’s Plan of Activities outlined in GOV/2002/10 to 
prevent nuclear terrorism:  In 2002, the Board of Governors 
of the IAEA approved a three-year Plan of Activities 
concerning IAEA’s nuclear security activities, such as those 
related to prevent theft of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
weapons-related materials and attacks on nuclear facilities.  
The Agency acknowledged, however, that the primary 
responsibility for the protection of nuclear weapons and 
materials lay with states and that the Agency’s assistance is 
circumscribed by scope permitted by each state;43  
● The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction, 2002: The Partnership 
sought to raise and spend fund on activities to support non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons;44 
● Amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials: Among other things, the 
Convention created expanded duties for states to secure 
nuclear materials in storage and during transit and to 
criminalize sabotage against civilian nuclear facilities 
(2005).45  
                                                            
43 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Nuclear Security—Measures to 
Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/50-GC(48)/6 (Aug. 
11, 2004). 
44 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction ("10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program"), NTI, 
https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/global-partnership-against-
spread-weapons-and-materials-mass-destruction-10-plus-10-over-10-program/ 
(last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
45 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Nuclear Security—Measures to 
Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism: Amendment to the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2005/10-
GC(49)/INF/6 (Sept. 6, 2005); see also Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in 
IAEA International Law Series No. 2 (2006) (establishing legally-binding 
measures for the prevention, detection, and punishment of offenses relating to 
nuclear material). The 2005 amendment sought to strengthen its provisions for 
protecting nuclear facilities and materials being used, stored, or transported for 
peaceful domestic purposes. The added article 2A 1(b) of the amendment calls on 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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In the post-9/11 times, multilateral efforts accelerated 
particularly rapidly following President Obama’s speech in 2009 at 
Prague, in which the U.S. President declared nuclear terrorism as 
“the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”46  The 
speech called on states to set new standards and cooperate in new 
partnerships to protect nuclear materials.47  However, the standards 
that emerged are general and lack enforceability.48   
Since President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, there have 
been four Nuclear Security Summits.  The Summits sought to secure 
nuclear materials, including stockpiles of highly enriched uranium 
(“HEU”) and plutonium, in several countries and to increase border, 
airports, and ports security through use of sophisticated technology 
and international cooperative efforts.49  The various international 
treaties, organizations, and initiatives that emerged as a result of the 
Summits, constituting the current international security regime, rely 
on voluntary engagement of participating countries.50  These treaties 
require states to judicially and logistically cooperate with one 
another to prevent terrorism and to punish terrorists.  For instance, 
the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism criminalizes nuclear terrorism under domestic laws of 
state parties and through promotion of inter-state police and judicial 
cooperation for investigating and punishing individuals’ acts of 
intentional and unlawful possession and use of nuclear device and 
radiological materials to threaten or harm other persons.51 
In the wake of the discovery of the A. Q. Khan’s illicit 
nuclear proliferation network, former U.S. President George Bush’s 
Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”) is another testimony to lack 
of confidence in the existing system.  The PSI is a U.S.-led 
                                                            
states to expand the scope of inter-state cooperation on measures to recover stolen 
or smuggled nuclear material, inter alia.   
46  Obama, supra note 29.    
47 Id. 
48 George Bunn, Enforcing International Standards: Protecting Nuclear 
Materials from Terrorists Post-9/11, 37 ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Jan./Feb. 2007). 
49 Bano & Sitaraman, supra note 37.  
50 Id.   
51 See International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism, supra note 41, arts. 2, 6, 14. 
15
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international effort to interdict WMD-related shipments and stop 
proliferation-related financing.  A coalition of eleven states took 
matters in their hands—so to speak—in self-defense through the 
multilateral cooperation initiative of PSI to prevent terrorists from 
acquiring nuclear weapons or their materials: the PSI prevents 
sensitive shipments to suspected destinations.  The PSI is  
 
a regime . . . designed for a new era, 
recognizing that proliferation threats 
today are different than those in the 
decades when the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was 
negotiated and supplier regimes such 
as the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) and the Australia Group were 
established.52 
 
In designing the tool of interdiction to respond to the challenge of 
nuclear weapons proliferation, the drafters of the Statement of 
Interdiction Principles claimed to have built the PSI upon existing 
treaties and regimes and under Security Council’s authority to 
address situations that threaten world peace and security, i.e., under 
general international law.53 
Measures devised by multilateral treaties remain of 
uncertain kinship with international law.  The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), which codified the pre-existing 
general law on the subject to treaties, states in article 26—entitled 
Pacta Sunt Servanda (“agreements must be kept”): “Every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith.”54  As such, treaties do not create obligations on non-
parties.  Under this view of treaties, scholars favor positivist 
construction of international law rules, stating that “[s]tate consent 
                                                            
52 Andrew C. Winner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New 
Face of Interdiction, 28 WASH. Q. 129, 130 (2005). 
53 Fact Sheet: Statement of Interdiction Principles, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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is the foundation of international law.  The principle that law is 
binding on a state only by its consent remains an axiom of the 
political system, an implication of State autonomy.”55  International 
law, according to this viewpoint, emerged for states by their consent.  
This viewpoint leaves non-state actors, lacking competence to 
consent to formation and implementation of international laws, 
outside the pale of international law.  The treaties mentioned in this 
section are indirect attempts to hold non-state actors, specifically, 
possible nuclear terrorists, responsible and culpable under 
international law. 
E. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
Alongside multilateral treaties, summits, and other related 
inter-country activities, often sponsored by the United Nations 
system, the Security Council also passed some resolutions with the 
objective to prevent nuclear terrorism.  In the post-Cold War times, 
most Security Council resolutions sought to respond to specific 
situations and to direct action toward specific countries for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.56  Two 
resolutions, Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540, however, 
purported to legally bind nations to tasks related to anti-terrorism.   
Resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001, under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, responded to the September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States, affirming that “such acts, like 
any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international 
                                                            
55 Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, 
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKLEY J. INT’L 
L. 137, 141 n.14 (2005) (quoting Louis Henkin, General Course on Public 
International Law, in IV RECUEIL DES COURS 46 (1989)). 
56 Joyner, supra note 25, at 506 (“[I]n each case the Council acted in 
response to a situation that had arisen in international relations.”); see, e.g., S.C. 
Res. 1696, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006) (demanding that Iran cease uranium enrichment 
activities by a deadline); S.C. Res. 687 (addressing Iraq’s alleged possession and 
threatened use of chemical and biological weapons); S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2 (Nov. 29, 
1990) (authorizing U.N. member states to use military force to expel Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. There had been other Resolutions also with regard to other places, 
such as the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. Those resolutions undertook enforcement 
action under the existing international law. 
17
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peace and security.”57  The Resolution characterizes the attacks as 
an “act of international terrorism” and calls on states to work 
together toward prevention of such acts in the future by denying 
access to funding and any other form of active or passive support to 
terrorists in their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and by 
developing a system of border controls and early warning, among 
other measures.   
Later, the Security Council Resolution 1540 unanimously 
passed on April 28, 2004, shortly after the discovery of the A. Q. 
Khan nuclear materials smuggling network.58 The Resolution 
expresses concern that non-state actors “may acquire, develop, 
traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their 
means of delivery” or engage in “illicit trafficking.”59  In expressly 
relating Resolution 1540 to non-state actors, the Security Council, 
interestingly, refers to those non-state actors that the Security 
Council Resolution 1373 had recognized, the ones involved in the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.   
Resolution 1540 requires extensive commitments from the 
U.N. member states.  The Resolution welcomes multilateral efforts 
to deal with the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in the context of non-state actors.  It exhorts states to 
cooperate in dealing with the threat of WMD terrorism emanating 
from non-state actors, forbidding states to support, directly or 
indirectly, private actors.  It calls on states to “develop and maintain 
appropriate effective physical protection measures”60 to protect 
nuclear materials and facilities; to enact and enforce national laws 
to prevent the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors; and “[t]o 
promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where 
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are 
                                                            
57 S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001). 
58 S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); see also Nuclear scientist asks 
forgiveness, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2004, 9:07 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/04/pakistan?INTCMP=ILCNETT
XT3487. 
59 S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 58, pmbl. 
60 Id. ¶ 3(b). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons.”61   
Resolution 1540 also mandates legally-binding obligations 
upon states.  While recognizing that member states are already 
bound by treaties and other legal commitments to prevent 
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and 
to protect critical materials, the Resolution urges states to do more 
to fully discharge their international legal obligations.62  It requires 
states to cooperate with one another, such as by coordinating efforts 
on border and export controls or by offering assistance to states that 
lack needed resources, to prevent illicit trafficking of WMD 
weapons and related sensitive materials.  Importantly, the 
Resolution requires that states criminalize WMD proliferation 
attempts by non-state actors and create an international network of 
cooperation and coordination to check infractions.  Significantly, the 
Resolution did not mention or refer to the NPT-based nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.  The omission implies that the Security 
Council regarded the NPT as irrelevant for the purposes of nuclear 
non-proliferation by non-state actors.   
The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 
1540, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative, are examples 
of such measures that international community took as the world 
faced a rising threat of nuclear terrorism.  Currently, it is clear the 
world community relies on these and similar other initiatives, as 
well as multilateral treaties, in seeking safety against nuclear 
terrorism and to limit its prospect.  Quietly bypassing the NPT-based 
nuclear nonproliferation regime of international laws, these 
instruments were designed to seek legitimation for international 
community’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts against non-state 
actors under the general international law, not under the specific 
international regime of nuclear nonproliferation.  Regardless of the 
source of legal authority for these attempts, however, it is clear that 
the efforts of: 
 
                                                            
61 Id. ¶ 8(a).  
62 Id. ¶ 2. 
19
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[t]he diverse collection of specific 
efforts to address this threat, such as 
securing the weapons of the former 
Soviet Union, export controls, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative and 
national anti-terrorism legislation, 
bespeak the ad hoc and sporadic 
nature of contemporary response to a 
hard reality not contemplated when 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
was designed.63 
F. Legality of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 
The articles of the U.N. Charter that mention disarmament 
shed light on the role of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council in the international system, an understanding of which is 
vital to comprehension of the legal controversy regarding passage 
of Resolution 1540.  Article 11(1) of the U.N. Charter gives the 
General Assembly the authority to “consider,” i.e., deliberate, “the 
general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international 
peace and security” and, possibly, “make recommendations . . . to 
the Members or to the Security Council or to both.”  Thus, under 
article 11(1), the General Assembly is to receive input of diverse 
perspectives.64  Under this understanding of the role of the General 
Assembly, when General Assembly’s first Resolution passed on 
January 24, 1946—under the title “Establishment of a Commission 
to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic 
Energy”—the General Assembly created the Atomic Energy 
Commission whose mandated task was to “enquire into all phases 
of the problem” and to make recommendations to the Security 
Council.65  
                                                            
63 Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecture for The Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 339, 344 (2007). 
64 See also Joyner, supra note 25, at 493 (noting “[t]he AEC [Atomic 
Energy Commission] was given a mandate to ‘proceed with utmost despatch and 
inquire into all phases of the problem’ of the discovery of atomic energy, and to 
make specific proposals”). 
65 G.A. Res. 1 (I), ¶ 5 (Jan. 24, 1946). 
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When the Security Council finds that a breach or threat of 
breach of peace exists, it proceeds to act in limited ways, in 
accordance with the guidelines that the U.N. Charter provides.  
Article 26 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to 
formulate plans, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, 
established under the U.N. Charter article 47.66  The plans, based on 
General Assembly’s recommendations of general principles of 
cooperation, are for regulation of armaments (states’ weapons), so 
as “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the 
world's human and economic resources.”67  Clearly, the idea of 
formulation of plans relates to states and not to private actors as the 
latter were not regarded as within the purview of the International 
system and had not figured as prominently as now they have.  Joyner 
argues that the U.N. Charter article 26 plans  
 
are to compose a coherent ‘system’ 
for the regulation of armaments, 
which would imply that the plans to 
be authored by the Council using this 
power are not to be situation-specific, 
as in the case of an ad hoc response to 
a discrete event in international 
affairs. Rather, these plans are to form 
the basis for a universally applicable, 
                                                            
66 U.N. Charter art. 26 (“In order to promote the establishment and 
maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for 
armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council 
shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff 
Committee referred to in article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the 
United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation "of 
armaments.”); see also Joyner, supra note 25, at 495 (arguing that, while article 
26 confers powers to the Security Council, it also makes Security Council’s role 
as complementary to that of the General Assembly in the exercise of General 
Assembly’s deliberative role under article 11(1)). Joyner points out that article 
11(1) also envisions such complementarity in General Assembly’s deliberative 
role concerning consideration of “general principles of cooperation” with respect 
to maintenance of international peace. Id. at 494. 
67 U.N. Charter art. 26. 
21
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enduring system of ‘practical and 
effective’ international arms 
control.”68  
 
That is, Security Council’s plans for maintenance of international 
peace and security are to be formed with assistance from the Military 
Staff Committee, and, once the plans are completed, they are to be 
submitted to the U.N. Members for approval.  Those plans for the 
execution of which all members of the United Nations have to agree 
can refer only to a system of universal application, not one for 
specific situations. 
 
Comparing U.N. Charter articles 11(1) and 26, Joyner notes that  
 
while Article 11(1) is in keeping with 
a principled notion of universal 
participation by . . . [all] states in the 
construction of fundamental 
principles . . . [to] order relations 
among states in the area of 
international arms control, Article 26 
is a recognition of the practical 
exigencies of international politics 
which demand that the Security 
Council, despite its unrepresentative 
character, have a vital role in the 
construction of plans for an 
international arms control system. . . . 
[T]he Security Council under Article 
26 only has the power to formulate 
plans. It must then submit those plans 
to the member states of the United 
Nations for their approval and for 
establishment through multilateral 
treaty as actual legal principles 
governing their relationships with 
                                                            
68 Joyner, supra note 25, at 496. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/19  8:23 PM 
2018] NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION  23 
each other.  The Security Council’s 
plans in and of themselves have no 
binding force on members, and are 
merely hortatory offerings, although 
endowed with the gravitas of having 
been generated through the Charter 
system for creation of arms control 
law . . . . Thus under the Charter 
system member states retain their full 
sovereignty over decisions to enter 
into legal relationships in the area of 
international arms control.   This right 
is not subsumed under the Council’s 
decision-making powers under 
Article 25 nor under its broad powers 
to maintain international peace and 
security under the articles of Chapter 
VII.69     
 
In other words, neither the General Assembly nor the Security 
Council can create new law for member states of the United Nations.  
Rather, the role of these two organs of the United Nations is that of 
“facilitating co-operation and co-ordination between member states 
in reaching concrete agreements on the regulation of armaments.”70  
For the purposes of this Article, the Security Council does not 
possess the legal capacity to make new rules for member states.71  
                                                            
69 Id. at 496; see also U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United 
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.”). 
70 Joyner, supra note 25, at 497. 
71 The Security Council of the United Nations also enjoys limited 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.  The Security Council 
may “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression,” under U.N. Charter art. 39, recommend provisional measures 
to parties to resolve the dispute, id. art. 40, decide non-military measures, in case 
the provisional measures prove to be ineffective, id. art. 41, or decide to take 
military measures as an exception to article 2(4), id. art. 42. Those powers are not 
at issue in the context of nuclear terrorism. The fact that they are limited might, 
however, constrain Council’s hands in taking effective action on the matter of 
23
IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/19  8:23 PM 
24 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:1 
The Security Council does not have legislative powers: “[n]either 
the Charter nor its preparatory materials evidence an intention to 
establish the Council as a legislative organ.”72  
The adoption of Resolution 1373 seems to have been a 
benchmark in international law; with it, the Security Council 
assumed a legislative role later to reinforce it by the adoption of 
Resolution 1540.73  Joyner argued against the jurisdictional legality 
of both Resolutions 1373 and 1540, pointing out that their passage 
reflected a shift in Security Council’s role and powers unwarranted 
under article 25 of the U.N. Charter,74  making the passage of both 
                                                            
nuclear terrorism. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). Theoretically, article 2(4) 
also constrains states from using force to quell threat of nuclear terrorism or actual 
nuclear terrorism by non-state terrorists operating from the territory of another 
state–unless the latter state’s conduct in exacerbating the threat or terroristic 
actions of non-state actors is implicated.  International law in this area is still 
evolving.  At this time, it is not clearly foreseeable whether the Security Council 
can be empowered to take military measures against a state from whose territory 
threat of nuclear weapon by non-state actors unsupported by their state in the 
issuance of the threat. See also Joyner, supra note 25, at 504. 
72 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the 
Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (2005). 
73 See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 175 (2005); see also VICTOR V. RAMRAJ ET AL., The 
Impossibility of Global Anti-Terrorism Law?, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW 
AND POLICY 44 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2012). In the days 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, “the Bush administration 
went to the UN Security Council and obtained a novel legal instrument, 
Resolution 1373 . . .  In one fell swoop, the Security Council assumed the role of 
an international legislative body, and assumed the power to monitor domestic 
legislative compliance.” Id. at 44–45. As a practical matter, however, the impacts 
of Resolution 1373, as Ramraj describes them, have not been altogether 
insalubrious.  The Resolution spurred a number of states to promulgate, 
implement, and coordinate national anti-terrorism laws.  Id. at 45–46. As a result, 
anti-terrorism laws of some states, such as the U.K., have emerged as models for 
other nations to follow, helping shape nascent legal norms in state practice 
concerning anti-terrorism. Id. at 45. Ramraj suggests that, following passage of 
the Resolution 1373, the existence of a coherent global anti-terrorism law might 
be assumed. Id. The result, if true, owes nothing to the NPT.     
74 Joyner, supra note 25, at 515. 
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Resolutions ultra vires acts on Security Council’s part.75  Curiously, 
the President of the Security Council was conscious of the fact that 
the organization was acting outside the scope of its authority.76   
 Security Council has vast powers under Chapter VII, to 
protect international peace and security through binding 
enforcement measures, including some discretionary powers.77  Yet 
all powers must rest on some legal source.  In 2003, during the 
process of adoption of Resolution 1483, concerning the status of 
occupying forces in Iraq, the President of the Security Council stated 
concerning the delegation of certain powers by the Security Council 
to the occupying Powers that  
 
under the Charter the powers 
delegated by the Security Council 
under this resolution are not open-
ended or unqualified. They should be 
exercised in ways that conform with 
“the principles of justice and 
international law” mentioned in 
Article 1 of the Charter, and 
especially in conformity with the 
Geneva Conventions and the 
Hague.78 
                                                            
75 Id. 
76 Press Conference by Security Council President, PRESS 
BRIEFING (2004), 
https://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/2004/pleugerpc.DOC.htm (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2018) (expressing concern on the possibility of terrorism involving 
weapons of mass destruction and the inability of international law to prevent it); 
see also Alyona Zhuk, Experts praise Poroshenko’s call for restrictions on UN 
Security Council veto powers, KYIV POST (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:24 PM), 
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/kyiv-post-plus/experts-praise-
poroshenkos-call-for-restrictions-on-un-security-council-veto-powers-
399497.html (arguing that the Big Power veto power in the Security Council has 
defeated many potential Security Council actions). 
77 Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra 
Vires or Ultra Innovative? 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 542, 553–54 (2004). 
78 Transcript of Speeches Regarding the Situation Between Iraq and 
Kuwait, 4761st Meeting of the Security Council, at 11–12 (Mar. 22, 2003), 
http://undocs.org/en/S/PV.4761. 
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This pronouncement leaves little doubt that the Security Council’s 
authority under Chapters VI and VII is circumscribed by the general 
principles given in the Charter of the U.N. and by the codification 
of these principles in such international instruments as the Geneva 
Convention.  A corollary of this fact is that any deviation from these 
principles and laws amounts to commission of ultra vires acts of the 
kind that the Security Council is blamed for in its passage of 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540, as noted above.     
Security Council’s resort to such acts was a desperate 
attempt to address the non-universality problem of the U.N. nuclear 
non-proliferation system.79  While the existing international system 
does not universally bind all states, operating on voluntary 
subscription by states, the Security Council sought to impose on 
states affirmative duties to which they had not agreed.80  Powers of 
international institutions, including those of the Security Council, 
however, are circumscribed by limits to which member states agree 
since consent of states, enshrined in constituent instruments, such as 
the Charter of the United Nations, is the basis of international law 
and the constitutionality of international institutions.81  Both 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 illegally cross those limits.  These 
attempts to address the issue of threat of nuclear weapons are, 
therefore, legally unsound.  
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S REACH TO NUCLEAR TERRORISTS 
A. Individual Responsibility in International Law 
Traditionally, under the classical, realist theory of 
international relations, states are considered to be the primary actors 
in the international system, and international law’s primary purpose 
                                                            
79 Joyner, supra note 25, at 508. 
80 Talmon, supra note 73, at 175; see also Rosand, supra note 77, at 548–
49 (supporting Security Council’s efforts to act as a global legislator through 
passage of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 as pragmatic measures for dealing with the 
new threat of global terrorism). 
81 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS 218–20 (1995). 
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is deemed to be regulation of relationship between states.82  In 
agreement with this idea, scholars have noted that “[s]tates made 
international law and were accountable to each other in meeting 
international legal obligations.”83  The law of state responsibility, 
which is at the center of international law, “provides that every 
internationally wrongful act entails the responsibility of the state  
. . .  Beyond this very general pronouncement, however, the law of 
state responsibility appears unsettled and has generated considerable 
theoretical debates and practical difficulties.”84   
Traditionally, individuals have remained invisible in 
international law, screened from responsibility for commission of 
acts, a situation that has eroded perception of international law’s 
competence in meeting challenges of non-state actors’ undesirable 
acts.85  With input from legal scholars and practitioners, however, 
international law has progressed; it has been evolving, slowly, to 
make room for individual responsibility.  In 1950, Lauterpacht 
argued that “there is cogency in the view that unless responsibility 
is imputed and attached to persons of flesh and blood, it rests with 
no one.”86  With reference to non-state actors’ responsibility under 
international law, in 1956, International Law Commission’s report 
on state responsibility under international law maintained that it was 
"necessary to change and adapt traditional law so that it will reflect 
the profound transformation which has occurred in international law 
. . .  [and] to bring the 'principles governing State responsibility' into 
line with international law at its present stage of development.”87  
                                                            
82 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 
6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 507 (1995). 
83 Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first 
Century, 96 AM. J.  INT’L L. 798, 798 (2002). 
84 RENE PROVOST, STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 
(2002). 
85 André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility 
and State Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 615, 617–
18 (2003).  
86 HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
40 (1950).  
87 Documents of the eighth session including the report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n annex, 173, 
176, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96. 
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That early concern about holding individuals responsible under 
international law for wrongful acts continued to echo in the 
international law scholarship in subsequent decades:   
 
 The subjects of international law are 
states but only in the sense that the 
present conceptual structure of 
international law attaches legal rights 
and duties to the category “state.” . . .  
The subjects of international law, in 
the sense of those for whose benefit 
the law assigns all rights and duties, 
are the people of the world.  The 
wrongful act of a state is the wrongful 
act of one set of human beings in 
relation to another set of human 
beings.  . . .  The moral effect of the 
law is vastly reduced if the human 
agents involved are able to separate 
themselves personally both from the 
duties the law imposes and from the 
responsibility it entails.88 
 
In line with these concerns and realizations, “[t]he legal nature of 
international law is perennially in question.”89   
Today, international law and the concept of responsibility in 
it have changed to reflect state actors’ growing role.  International 
law has now, under specific international agreements or under 
customary international law, extended to individuals and other non-
state entities the right to invoke state responsibility, the 
responsibility owed to them by their own state or by other states.90  
Following this development, 
 
                                                            
88 Philip Allott, State Responsibility and Unmaking of International Law, 
29 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (1988). 
89 PROVOST, supra note 84, at Introduction. 
90 Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First 
Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 798–99 (2002). 
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 [a] large number of criminal law 
treaties, prosecutions of individuals in 
national and international courts and 
the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court have taken 
individuals away from behind the 
shield of the state. International law 
leaves it no longer to the national 
legal order to determine which 
individuals are subjected to 
obligations and responsibilities and 
confronts individuals now directly 
with legal consequences of their 
acts.91   
 
Nollkaemper further wrote “[a]s of yet, the individualisation of 
responsibility takes the form of international criminal responsibility.  
However, there is no principled reason why it could not also 
manifest itself in international civil responsibility.”92  This thought 
reflects scholarly acceptance, if not purposeful guidance, of the 
steadily emerging change with respect to the concept of 
responsibility under international law. 
Along the path of this progression in international law, 
certain individual acts carry individual responsibility alongside state 
responsibility.93 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
for Nuremberg recognized individual responsibility early on in the 
context of trials for war crimes.  The Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for Nuremberg recognized individual 
responsibility early on in the context of trials for war crimes.  The 
judges at Nuremberg wrote as they punished Nazi leader for their 
crimes: “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
                                                            
91 Nollkaemper, supra note 85, at 618. 
92 Id. at 618 n.14. 
93 See generally id. at 617–18 (arguing that the law of state 
responsibility has expanded to include individual responsibility side by side 
state responsibility in its domain). 
29
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enforced.”94  The Nuremberg Trial is claimed to have strengthened 
the notion that international law can and should punish individuals 
for certain heinous crimes through exercise of jurisdiction of 
international courts, and, in doing so, “rejected historically used 
defenses based on state sovereignty.”95  The U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 95, entitled “Affirmation of the Principles of 
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnburg 
[Nuremberg] Tribunal” acknowledged that the principles of the 
Nuremberg Charter were principles of international law.96 Thus, 
early on, international law evinced signs of favor for holding 
individuals responsible for certain acts. 
B. Prosecution of Individuals under International Human Rights 
Law and under International Humanitarian Law 
International human rights law, while prominently 
recognizing individual rights and freedoms, does not overlook 
individual duties to the community.  Concerning human rights, for 
instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) 
foresees “the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy 
. . . freedom from fear” and makes it a state obligation to ensure that 
human rights and freedoms are protected through domestic justice 
system.97 The UDHR mentions individual responsibility indirectly: 
article 29 of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone has duties to the 
community. . . .”  Article 29(2) of UDHR reads further in part that 
                                                            
94 William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-
International Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 906, 906 (2002).   
95  ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on 
International Criminal Law, https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-
writing/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/ (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2018). “The Nuremberg trials established that all of humanity 
would be guarded by an international legal shield and that even a Head of State 
would be held criminally responsible and punished for aggression and Crimes 
Against Humanity. The right of humanitarian intervention to put a stop to Crimes 
Against Humanity – even by a sovereign against his own citizens – gradually 
emerged from the Nuremberg principles affirmed by the United Nations.” Id. 
96 G.A. Res. 95 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946).  
97 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948); see id. art. 29, ¶ 1 
(“Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.”). 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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“[i]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others.”   
The Declaration, being an expression of principles, does not 
bind states or persons.98  The UDHR are statements of peoples’ 
commitment to human rights under the United Nations Charter.99  
The norms that the UDHR embodies are, however, incorporated in 
several international agreements and treaties.  Over time,  
 
 [m]any of the Universal Declaration's 
provisions also have become 
incorporated into customary 
international law, which is binding on 
all states. This development has been 
confirmed by states in 
intergovernmental and diplomatic 
settings; in arguments submitted to 
judicial tribunals, by the actions of 
                                                            
98 Eleanor Roosevelt, Address to the United Nations General Assembly 
on the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 9, 1948) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/HumanRightsSP10/CourseDocs
/2EleanorRoosevelt.pdf) (“It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It 
is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a 
Declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms, . . . to serve as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations. . . This Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights may well become the international Magna Carta of 
all men everywhere.”).  
99 See U.N. Charter art. 55(c) (“[T]he United Nations shall promote . . . 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”); see also Hurst 
Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National 
and International Law. 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 352–53 (1995) (“Legally 
and politically, it is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which defines the 
Charter's human rights provisions. As the primary source of the global consensus 
on human rights––which was reaffirmed in the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna––the Declaration represents the only common ground when 
many states discuss human rights.”). 
31
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intergovernmental organizations; and 
in the writings of legal scholars.100   
 
The major international instruments incorporating the UDHR 
norms/rights are the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1976,101 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, 1976.102  Other specific human rights 
international treaties that elaborate upon some UDHR rights include 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force in 
1987.103   Notably, following suit and referring to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirmed everyone’s 
rights to social, cultural, and economic freedoms and noted that “the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of 
duties on the part of everyone.”104   
Many other international human rights instruments that hold 
solely states responsible, however, do not hold people responsible 
for committing atrocities.  Most still expand the idea of 
responsibility under international law.  The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for instance, 
affirms that genocide is an international crime for the Contracting 
                                                            
100 Hannum, supra note 99, at 289. 
101 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976). 
102 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), annex (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
103 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 
June 26, 1987). 
104 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights pmbl., June 27, 1981, 
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1986) (explicitly referring to 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which affirms that everyone has right to enjoy social, cultural, and economic 
freedoms). The Charter also considered that “the enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone. Id.; see 
also arts. 27–29 (concerning individuals’ duties). 
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/19  8:23 PM 
2018] NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION  33 
Parties whether committed in time of war or in time of peace.105 The 
Convention, thus, expands the scope of applicability of the law of 
responsibility from war context to peace situations; it places 
obligation, however, upon signatory states, not individuals, to 
prevent genocide.  The International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,106 similarly, makes persons 
only indirectly responsible for commission of atrocious acts by 
holding states primarily responsible for racial discrimination against 
persons.  The contracting parties of the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
likewise, undertake to uphold the UDHR freedoms and rights by 
enacting appropriate legislation to punish violators.107  The 
                                                            
105 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“The Contracting Parties 
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention 
and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or 
of any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”); see id. art. III (including 
genocide as well as attempt, incitement, conspiracy, complicity of genocide).  
106 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Paying regard to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention binds the contracting state parties 
to declare in article 4(a) “an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well 
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of 
persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance 
to racist activities, including the financing thereof.”); id. art. 4(b) (stating that state 
contracting parties “[s]hall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also 
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial 
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or 
activities as an offence punishable by law.”). 
107 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid art. IV, July 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244 [hereinafter 
Apartheid Convention] (“The States Parties to the present Convention undertake: 
(a) To adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to 
prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist 
policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of that crime; (b) To 
adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to prosecute, bring to trial 
and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction persons responsible for, or 
accused of, the acts defined in article II of the present Convention, whether or not 
such persons reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or 
are nationals of that State or of some other State or are stateless persons.”). 
33
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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment similarly, obligates state parties to 
criminalize individuals’ commission of enumerated atrocities.108  
Following the Convention's entry into force, absolute prohibition 
against torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment has become accepted as a principle of 
customary international law; that is, the applicability of these 
prohibitions under the Convention has been broadened to include 
non-signatory states.109    
It might be fair to state that the incorporation of the UDHR 
principles in later international law instruments has not been 
uniform.  The fact that some of its principles have become elevated 
to the status of customary international law, however, bodes well for 
greater incorporation of international human rights laws in 
international legal instruments in the future.  Specifically, the 
expansion of international human rights laws with respect to the 
concept of responsibility under international law opens up the 
possibility that, over time, individual perpetrators of heinous crimes, 
such as those committed with use of nuclear weapons, can be held 
responsible under revised, evolved, or expanded international laws 
of nuclear proliferation.  
International humanitarian rights laws also offer such a 
prospect.  Traditionally, international humanitarian rights 
instruments, such as the Geneva Conventions,110 also place 
                                                            
108 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 103, art. IV (“1. Each State Party shall 
ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall 
apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which 
constitutes complicity or participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make 
these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their 
grave nature.”). 
109 See id. pmbl. (“Desiring to make more effective the struggle against 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout 
the world . . . .” 
110 See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention 
III), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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responsibility on states to criminalize inhuman and atrocious 
behavior.  For instance, article 146 of the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
requires that States Parties "enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or 
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present 
Convention.”  As the title of the Convention indicates, the sanctions 
are to be applied only during times of war, i.e., when there is an 
international adversarial engagement of armed forces.  Yet, in the 
Tadić case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) noted that, as early as 
the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39, international law 
has been increasingly becoming involved in non-international 
armed conflict, the civil war.111  The greater involvement of 
international humanitarian laws in civil wars, as well as international 
wars, indicates humanitarian laws’ greater amenability to bringing 
both states and individuals within the purview of the law.   
Giving an account of evolution in this area of law, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY pointed out that the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) had recognized in the 1985 Nicaragua case 
that certain minimum humanitarian standards must be upheld during 
internal armed conflict.112  The standards primarily bind state parties 
to international legal instruments incorporating international 
humanitarian law, obligating states to legislate, investigate, 
prosecute, and punish violations of people’s rights and freedoms 
against persons.113  Those requirements have also, arguably, passed 
into the customary international law.114   
                                                            
Convention IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1950);  
111 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 100 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“As early as the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-39), State practice revealed a tendency to disregard the distinction between 
international and internal wars and to apply certain general principles of 
humanitarian law, at least to those internal conflicts that constituted large-scale 
civil wars.”). 
112 Id. ¶¶ 101–02. 
113 Schabas, supra note 94, at 910. 
114 Id. 
35
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States’ obligations under international humanitarian law, 
however, extend only with respect to certain identified heinous 
violations that can be characterized as “international crimes”115 The 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) exercises jurisdiction over 
international crimes.116  The ICC hears cases of a category of crimes 
that the ICJ considered under the Arrest Warrant case.117 These 
enumerated crimes—crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes—do not include terrorism in general or terrorism 
involving weapons of mass destruction.118  The passage of the 
humanitarian laws’ requirements into the customary international 
law, however, opens up the possibility of their broader application. 
 
 
                                                            
115 Id. 
116 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1988, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("Recalling that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes”); Schabas, supra note 94, at 910 (pointing out that the concept of 
“international crimes” has not been expatiated upon by the Rome Statute). Rather, 
it is a customary international law concept that imposes a duty upon states to 
prosecute international crimes committed both within and outside their territory. 
Id. In other words, the concept of “international crimes” pre-exists International 
Criminal Court in international custom.  The ICC merely reminds states of their 
jurisdiction of such crimes and of their duty in that regard. Id. 
117 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 2002 (Feb. 14). 
118 In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
mentioned “crimes against humanity” and “war crimes” rather than “international 
crimes.” See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13, 58, 64. Similarly, the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees recognized two categories of crimes to which the 
convention applied: (1) a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity; and (2) “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.” Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(F)(c), July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137; see Schabas, supra note 94, at 911 (arguing that, based on these 
specific distinctions, some international crimes, such as drug trafficking, fail to 
lend the gravitas that characterize violations of a fundamental human right and 
are therefore not covered under the Statute). One could also note that the war 
crime triggers international jurisdiction due to the cost it entails in human 
suffering, and a crime against humanity, similarly, comprises other acts that are 
contrary to United Nation’s purposes and principles, which also seek to alleviate 
human suffering and indignity.) 
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C. Individual Responsibility under International Law in 
International and Non-International Armed Conflict 
International law has historically been concerned with 
international, rather than non-international armed conflict.  In the 
context of wars, international humanitarian law has been 
traditionally concerned primarily with states’ reciprocal 
commitments on matters such as treatment of non-combatant 
victims.   
The distinction between international crimes and non-
international crimes became gradually blurred with time.  For 
instance, in the 1930s’ Spanish Civil War, the internal nature of the 
conflict lessened the role of international law, and, yet, the 
jurisdiction of international law were applied in the case of internal 
conflict against the insurgent non-state actors.119  The international 
humanitarian law following Spanish Civil War developed, like the 
international human rights law, to protect individual rights against 
states.120  In the same vein, article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the common article to all four Geneva Conventions, 
entitled “Conflicts not of an International Character,” recognizes 
that certain rules of the laws of war apply to conflicts that are 
internal.  Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions defines a conflict not 
of international character as the one between a state’s armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups, not 
including riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence.121   
                                                            
119 See Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 100. The Spanish Civil War had 
elements of both an internal and an international armed conflict. “Significantly, 
both the republican Government and third States refused to recognize the 
insurgents as belligerents. They nonetheless insisted that certain rules concerning 
international armed conflict applied.” Id. 
120 Schabas, supra note 94, at 914–15.   
121  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). 
Protocol II elaborates in article 1(1) on armed conflicts not of international 
character as the ones “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of 
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations.”  The Additional Protocol II excludes from this definition in article 
37
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An act of nuclear terrorism is likely to be characterized as an 
armed conflict.  If non-state actors threaten to use or use nuclear 
arms, the conflict is likely to be characterized as non-international 
armed conflict simply because the conflict is not between states, 
regardless of whether nuclear terrorism is internal or transnational.  
International law of armed conflict has been gradually expanding to 
encompass acts that are neither strictly international nor perpetrated 
by states.122  An important question for the purposes of this Article 
is whether non-state actors committing extreme violence using 
nuclear weapons can be punished under international law when their 
act relates to a non-international armed conflict.  
It is pertinent to note that, in the case of nuclear terrorism, as 
in the case of almost any crime, the primary avenue for prosecution 
is to be courts of the state in which such terrorism is committed.  
Regarding some crimes,  
 
[t]he right to justice entails 
obligations for the State: to 
investigate violations, to prosecute 
the perpetrators and, if their guilt is 
established, to punish them . . . . On 
principle, it should remain the rule 
that national courts have jurisdiction, 
because any lasting solution must 
come from the nation itself. But all 
too often national courts are not yet 
capable of handing down impartial 
justice or are physically unable to 
function.123   
 
                                                            
1(2) “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts.” See also Schabas, supra note 94, at 914–15. 
122 Schabas, supra note 94, at 914. 
123 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil 
and political), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, ¶¶ 27–28, (June 26, 1997). 
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Schabas points out that an act by a non-state actor defined as an 
international crime entails that states prosecute offenses that might 
be committed outside their territory, and if a state that obtains 
custody of the person is unable to do so, it should hand over the 
accused to another state that is more willing and able to do so under 
the principle expressed as aut dedere aut judicare, translated as 
“extradite or prosecute.”124  It is unclear whether this principle is 
part of customary international law.125  The same is the case of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction.126 Implicitly, this principle is 
coextensive with that of aut dedere aut judicare, but is less used in 
treaties.127  For either principle, the status of the principle as a norm 
of customary international law is debated only in the context of 
offenses that can be defined as international crimes.128  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute” or “Statute”) offers greater conceptual clarity as to 
the expanding reach of international law over perpetrators of crimes 
in international and non-international armed conflicts.129   The 
                                                            
124 Schabas, supra note 94, at 912–13. 
125 See Schabas, supra note 94, at 913 (“This obligation is set out in in 
article 5(2) of the Convention against Torture and in the ‘grave breaches’ 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. However, [it is omitted from] the 
Genocide Convention or the Apartheid Convention.”). This makes it unclear 
whether a customary norm to prosecute or extradite exists. Id. at 917. 
126 INT’L JUSTICE RES. CTR., Universal Jurisdiction, 
http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-
universal-jurisdiction/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (stating that under universal 
jurisdiction, a national court can exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute individuals 
for serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and 
torture, on the grounds that such crimes are committed against the international 
community or international order). National courts generally invoke universal 
jurisdiction in the absence of other, traditional bases of criminal jurisdiction, such 
as nationality of the state whose court is seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction, 
when the crime was not committed within the territory of the state, or when 
national interests are not harmed. Id. 
127 Schabas, supra note 94, at 913 (pointing out that this concept was 
purposefully omitted from some treaties, such as Genocide Convention, because 
states wished to avoid giving other states pretext for intervention in domestic 
matters, particularly for political reasons). 
128 Id.   
129 Rome Statute, supra note 116; see also Schabas, supra note 94, at 
914–15.   
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Statute defines armed conflict not of international character in a 
manner similar to the Geneva Convention.  Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute, entitled “War Crimes” confers jurisdiction to ICC on both 
international armed conflict—article 8(2)(b)—and armed conflicts 
not of international character—article (8)(2)(c).  The latter is defined 
as a “serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions.”  Article 8(2)(d) excludes from International Criminal 
Court’s jurisdiction over armed conflicts not of an international 
character “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
nature.”  Article 8(2)(b) lists in general terms violations that fall 
within ICC’s jurisdiction over armed conflicts not of an 
international character.  More pertinent, for the purpose of this 
Article, however, are the “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international 
character” listed under article 8(2)(e).  Article 8(2)(e)(i) gives ICC 
jurisdiction over acts of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the 
civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking 
direct part in hostilities.”  Article 8(2)(e) is not applicable to “riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
nature”; under article 8(2)(f) it applies “when there is protracted 
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups.” That is, the armed conflict 
has to rise above loosely joined bandits and rioting groups of non-
state actors to non-state actor groups with certain organizational 
capacity before the conflicts fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.   
While legal specifics regarding culpability of non-state 
actors might differ under the Geneva Convention and the Rome 
Statute, in principle the two international law instruments recognize 
culpability under international law of organized groups of non-state 
actors violating norms of international conflict in the context of non-
international conflict, indicating consonance on this matter between 
international humanitarian laws and international criminal laws.   
Beyond recognition of culpability of non-state actors under 
international law, the next question arises whether non-state actors 
can be punished in international courts for international crimes 
committed during armed conflict not of international character.  
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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D. Punishment of Non-State Actors under International Law 
That individuals can be held responsible, i.e., punished, for 
certain violations of international law was central to the Nuremburg 
Principles.130  In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly 
affirmed “the principles of international law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nurnberg [Nuremburg] Tribunal and the judgment of 
the Tribunal.”131  The concept, however, was limited then to the 
context of war.132  
The Geneva Conventions too recognized individual 
responsibility in the same sense under the principle of prosecute or 
extradite for serious crimes through a “grave breach” doctrine.133  
They considered, however, only those crimes that were committed 
in the context of international armed conflicts, and, although non-
international violations could be criminal under the common article 
3, those violations did not constitute international crimes and could 
not, therefore, be punished under international law.134   
In 1995, however, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY ruled, 
in Prosecutor v. Tadić, contrary to the previously accepted opinion 
of legal and judicial scholars, on the question of jurisdiction of the 
international tribunal over individuals.135  The Appeals Chamber 
wrote that the nature of certain offenses are such that “do not affect 
the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of 
                                                            
130 See Formulation of the Principles of International Law Recognized 
in the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal 
[1956] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 28–58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950. 
131 G.A. Res. 95 (I), supra note 96. 
132 Schabas, supra note 94, at 917. 
133 Grave breaches specified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in 
additional Protocol I of 1977, ICRC, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jp2a.htm (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2019) (including the following offenses: willful killing, torture or 
inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering, causing serious injury to 
body or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly). 
134 Schabas, supra note 94, at 917. 
135 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Defense Brief to 
Support the Notice of (Interlocutory) Appeal (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Aug. 25, 1995). 
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mankind.”136  More significantly, and pertinent for the purposes of 
this Article, the Appeals Chamber also wrote that “[i]t is by now a 
settled rule of customary international law that crimes against 
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict 
. . . [C]ustomary international law may not require a connection 
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.” That is, a 
“crime against humanity” can arise when there is a conflict and 
when there is no conflict, internal or international.  Therefore, 
dismissing the challenge to its jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that it had “jurisdiction over crimes committed in either 
internal or international armed conflicts.”137  In other words, the 
Appeals Chamber assumed jurisdiction over cases where extreme 
atrocities were committed in conflicts related to armed domestic 
and/or international conflict.   
The U.N. support for prosecution of serious international 
crimes committed during either internal or international armed 
conflicts was emphasized in the case of non-international armed 
struggle in Sierra Leone.  The Peace Agreement created amnesty for 
the warring persons of the Revolutionary Front of Sierra Leone.138  
However, the United Nations Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Sierra Leone stated that the amnesty provision 
did not apply to “international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international 
                                                            
136Id. ¶ 57. Citing an earlier case, the Appeals Chamber wrote: “Crimes 
against the laws and customs of war cannot be considered political offences, as 
they do not harm a political interest of a particular State, nor a political right of a 
particular citizen. They are, instead, crimes of lèse-humanité (reati di lesa 
umanità) and, as previously demonstrated, the norms prohibiting them have a 
universal character, not simply a territorial one. Such crimes, therefore, due to 
their very subject matter and particular nature are precisely of a different and 
opposite kind from political offences. The latter generally, concern only the States 
against whom they are committed; the former concern all civilised States, and are 
to be opposed and punished, in the same way as the crimes of piracy, trade of 
women and minors, and enslavement are to be opposed and punished, wherever 
they may have been committed.” Id. 
137 Id. ¶ 142. 
138 S.C. Res. 777 (July 7, 1999). 
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humanitarian law.”139  Meisenberg140 found the decision to be 
unconvincing and controversial due to the fact that the Appeals 
Chamber invoked universal jurisdiction (i.e., its own rightful 
jurisdiction over the case) before addressing Sierra Leone’s duty 
under international law to investigate and prosecute.141  Meisenberg, 
however, acknowledged that the decision was an important step in 
the development of international humanitarian law’s expanse over 
non-state actors who commit serious crimes in a non-international 
armed conflict.142  Evaluating the shift in international law regarding 
international law’s jurisdictional reach over non-state actors, 
Schabas wrote, 
 
It is now beyond any doubt that war 
crimes and crimes against humanity 
are punishable as crimes of 
international law when committed in 
non-international armed conflict. 
Non-State actors, who may be 
members of guerrilla movements, 
armed bands, and even provisional 
governments, are subject to 
                                                            
139 U. N. Secretary-General, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶ 7, UN Doc. S/1999/836 (July 30, 
1999). 
140 Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International 
Humanitarian Law. The Lomé Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 86 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA CROIX-ROUGE [INT’L REV. RED CROSS] 
837, 845 (2004) (Fr.).  
141 Meisenberg, supra note 139, at 851 (“The Appeals Chamber did not 
address Sierra Leone’s own duty to investigate and prosecute in international law, 
but merely based its findings on the principle of universality. Such an approach is 
unconvincing, owing to the unusual place of the Special Court in international 
law, and incompatible with the country’s legal obligation to transfer arrested 
persons to the court, since the court lacks its own enforcement mechanisms. The 
court should have specifically established treaty obligations for Sierra Leone to 
prosecute with regard to all crimes before it and to non-international armed 
conflict in particular, rather than invoke the principle of universal jurisdiction in 
order to rule that the amnesties granted are no bar to prosecution before an 
international and foreign court.”). 
142 Id. at 843. 
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prosecution on this basis. Where, for 
whatever reason, trials are not 
possible or desirable before the courts 
of the territory where the crimes have 
taken place, justice systems of other 
States may assume their 
responsibilities and prosecute on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction. 
Amnesty or some other measure of 
impunity applicable in the State 
where the crime has taken place, is no 
obstacle or bar to trial elsewhere. 
These developments in the law—
most of them quite recent—mean that 
perpetrators of serious violations of 
human rights during non-
international armed conflicts, 
including non-State actors, are far 
less likely to escape justice than they 
were in the past.143  
 
It is clear that international law reaches non-state actors. 
E. International Law’s Reach over Possible Nuclear Terrorists 
Specifically, war crimes and crimes against humanity have 
come within the grip of international law.  Crimes against humanity, 
a matter of interest for this Article in the context of feared nuclear 
terrorism, require a finding under the Rome Statute—which created 
the International Criminal Court—that acts be “committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack” to qualify as crimes 
against humanity.144  International law has come a long way, it 
appears; however, the question arises whether it can reach non-state 
actors if they commit nuclear terrorism.  
                                                            
143 Schabas, supra note 94, at 922. 
144 Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 7.  
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In the wake of the extremely violent events of September 11, 
2001, the United Nations High Commissioner denounced the 
terrorist attacks on the United States as “crimes against 
humanity.”145  The classification fitted as the attacks were regarded 
as being part of a systematic attack against a civilian population with 
knowledge of the attack.146   
Even when a terroristic act fits the definition of crimes of 
humanity, it cannot be prosecuted by the ICC.  The Rome Statute 
excludes terrorism from ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.  At the 
time of delineating ICC’s jurisdiction, the Final Act of the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“Final Act”)147 
expressed regret that although terrorist acts constitute “serious 
crimes of concern to international community,” lacking a generally 
acceptable definition, terrorism could not be included in jurisdiction 
of the proposed ICC.148  
In the past, some states—Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and 
Turkey—proposed considering terrorism as a crime against 
humanity and subjecting it to ICC’s jurisdiction.  Those who 
rejected the proposal adduced four reasons: (1) terrorism could not 
be precisely defined; (2) inclusion of terrorism to ICC’s jurisdiction 
would introduce political divisions in the Court; (3) only some acts 
terrorism are serious enough to justify jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal; and (4) national courts are more efficient than 
international tribunals.149   Obviously, participants in the debate 
were not at the time cognizant of the possibility of nuclear terrorism, 
                                                            
145 Terror attacks on US were crimes against humanity, UN rights 
official says, UN NEWS (Sept. 25, 2001), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2001/09/15342-terror-attacks-us-were-crimes-
against-humanity-un-rights-official-says; see also Cassese, supra note 13, at 993–
95. 
146 Id. 
147 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Final Act of the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I) (June 15–July 
17, 1998). 
148 Id. annex I, E. 
149 Cassese, supra note 13, at 494. 
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which, by its very nature, is an extreme act of violence.150 
Regardless of lack of this cognizance, excluding all acts of terrorism 
from ICC’s jurisdiction because “some” acts of terrorism are not 
serious enough appears to be a weak reason.  A stronger reason for 
the proposal’s rejection seems to be the objection by some 
developing countries that feared that peoples’ struggle for freedom 
from foreign domination could come to be characterized as 
terrorism.151  Also, the problem of definition of acts of terrorism 
arises from the concern to identify such distinct acts as serial killing 
or killings and other destructive acts in a course of drug trafficking, 
which can have the characteristics of being widespread and 
systematic.152  The Final Act, however, affirmed that the matter is 
not closed: the review mechanism of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court allows for a future expansion of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  The Final Act, in fact, recommended that under article 
123 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court a 
Review Conference should consider arriving at an acceptable 
definition of terrorist crimes and including them within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.153  By following up on this recommendation, acts of 
terrorism may be subsumed within “crimes against humanity,” 
whose definition has over time moved away from strict adherence 
to crimes that are committed, supported, incited, or tolerated by a 
state to those committed by individuals without any state 
involvement, as discussed above.  The law in this area, however, is 
still unsettled, and scope remains for bringing terrorism under 
“crimes against humanity,” over which ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction. 
                                                            
150 NUKEMAP BY ALEX WELLERSTEIN, 
https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) (hosting a 
simulation that produces dire results with a virtual detonation of terrorist-made 
crude nuclear weapon of 10 kilo tons–the size North Korea tested in 2013–
detonated as airburst over Washington, D.C. would create 54,380 fatalities and 
86,080 injuries). 
151 Cassese, supra note 13, at 994. 
152 Schabas, supra note 94. 
153 Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 123 (noting that the Rome Statute 
of the ICC provides, under this article, for the review of the Statute seven years 
after its entry into force). 
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The problem of finding a definition of terrorism that 
distinguishes terrorism from an ordinary crime and forms of 
nationalist struggles has lingered over a long period of time.   Treaty 
law has struggled with the issue since 1920s.154  The League of 
Nations, the International Law Commission, and the General 
Assembly have pondered on the issue.155  The fact that the 
international community has made multiple and protracted attempts 
does not provide evidence of emergence of a customary law; yet, 
treaties carry evidence of generally accepted rules,156 and, therefore, 
the attempts delineate outlines and sharpen basic features of what 
behaviors international community proscribes or criminalizes.  In 
other words, the repeated and recurring attempts to pin down a 
generic definition of terrorism testifies to the normative importance 
that the world community places on the matter.157  Early on, the 
international community realized that sound definition will hinge 
upon the underlying motive of the act to distinguish it from an 
organized transnational crime committed for material benefit or 
struggles for a peoples’ self-determination.158 
It is conceivable to extract such a definition from the 
Protocol 1 of the 1977 Amendment to the Geneva Convention.  Saul 
suggests that the Amendment enshrines international humanitarian 
law, as well as it contains provisions that proscribe behaviors that 
can be considered “terrorism,” thus helping us reach a generic 
definition of terrorism in a way that can make terrorism punishable 
under international humanitarian law that the Geneva Conventions 
                                                            
154 Ben Saul, Attempts to Define Terrorism in International Law, 
52 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 57, 58 (2005) (explaining why and giving examples to 
prove that terrorism is difficult to define in international law.); see generally id. 
155 Id. at 59–66 (listing various attempts by the League of Nations to 
arrive at a consensus on the definition of the term “terrorism” during various 
international conferences); id. at 66–68 (detailing similar attempts by the 
International Law Commission during the drafting of its 1954 Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part I)); see generally id. at 
72–83 (detailing multiple attempts by the UN General Assembly to address the 
threat of terrorism by arriving at a definition, particularly in the context of the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court). 
156 Id. at 58. 
157 Id. at 65. 
158 Id. at 79–80 
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represent.159  Although the Protocol 1 of 1977 primarily relates to 
armed conflicts, it bans certain behaviors that, when enacted in 
either international or non-international armed conflicts—that is, 
when the armed conflict is between states and when the armed 
conflict involves non-state actors—can be characterized as 
terroristic, rather than purely military combat behaviors.  Articles 
51, entitled “Protection of the Civilian Population,” for instance, 
prohibits attacks on civilian population.  Article 51(2), specifically, 
prohibits “[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which 
is to spread terror among the civilian population” or “indiscriminate 
attacks.”  Article 51(4) prohibits “indiscriminate attacks,” 
specifying, inter alia, that indiscriminate attacks include “[those] 
that are not directed at a specific military objective,” and in general 
“are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian 
objects without distinction.”  Articles 51 and 54 outlaw 
indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations and destruction of 
food, water, and other materials needed for 
survival. Indiscriminate attacks include directly attacking civilian 
(non-military) targets, and also attacking civilians by using 
technology such as biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and land 
mines.  It is, thus, possible to extract a definition of terrorism from 
the Protocol 1 of the 1977 Amendment to the Geneva Convention.   
F. Jus Cogens, or Peremptory Norm of International Law, 
against Nuclear Proliferation by Non-State Actors and Nuclear 
Terrorism 
Article 53 of the VCLT 1969, defines, for the purposes of 
the Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law 
(“jus cogens”) as “a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”   The Convention, thus, dictates that a norm be 
considered to be “peremptory,” and, thus, not be derogated from, if 
the international community “as a whole” accepts and recognizes it.  
Examples of such norms are the use of force, slavery, genocide, and 
                                                            
159 Id. at 81–83. 
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piracy.160  Legal practitioners and scholars have regarded that 
definition to be applicable to the international law at large, and not 
just for the purposes of the 1969 VCLT.161 
In this connection, with regard to constitutionality of acts of 
international organizations, Orakhelashvili made an important 
observation concerning distinction between jus dispositivum and jus 
cogens.162   International organizations can lawfully disregard the 
former, the ordinary norms of international law, “provided and to 
the extent that the constituent instrument evidences the intention of 
member states to enable the organization to act in such manner while 
exercising its functions.”163  However, “if a relevant norm is 
peremptory [i.e., it is recognized as jus cogens], then states cannot 
derogate from it, establishing an organization with the power to act 
in disregard of jus cogens.  Therefore, jus cogens is an inherent 
limitation on any organization’s powers.”164  In other words, when 
a peremptory norm of international law emerges, international 
organizations are guided by it rather than their constituent 
instruments, which are based on states’ consent.  That is, 
international organizations are to follow peremptory norms even if 
a state has not explicitly consented to it.  This argument promises 
progress for the objective of punishing possible nuclear terrorists by 
hinting that acts of extreme violence that conflict with international 
law’s jus cogens, or peremptory norms, might be brought within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC without explicit assignment of ICC’s 
jurisdiction over terrorism and without a legal definition of those 
acts as “terrorism.”  In the section on individual responsibility 
above, the discussion made it clear that the ICC has already assumed 
jurisdiction over individuals in both international and non-
international armed conflict where the acts fall under specified 
                                                            
160 M. FITZMAURICE & A. QUAST, LAW OF TREATITES: SECTION A: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 17 (2007).  
161 Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened 
Pandora's Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
853, 854–55 (2007). 
162 Orakhelashvili, supra note 72, at 60.    
163 Id. 
164 Id.   
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categories.  While a case can be made by defining terrorism 
accompanied by extreme violence, such as nuclear terrorism, as a 
crime against humanity to bring the acts within the jurisdiction of 
ICC, another avenue of potential success in the objective of 
punishing nuclear terrorists would be to actively promote 
prohibition of such acts, punishing them up on the hierarchy of 
norms to rise to the level of just cogens, as discussed below. 
de Wet points out that in the international legal system a 
hierarchy of norms has emerged, such that the peremptory norms, or 
jus cogens, are primarily related to human rights norms.165  In fact, 
the VCLT made it illegal for states to conclude mutual treaties that 
violate a peremptory law.166  Currently, the few norms that have 
become jus cogens recognize prohibition of genocide, torture, 
slavery, and similar other crimes.167  In those crimes, individuals or 
states, the perpetrators of actions, become subject to universal 
jurisdiction.168   
Interestingly, de Wet observed that certain crimes rose to the 
status of jus cogens because the normative framework of the U.N. 
Charter system positively elevated certain values above others, 
through codification, such as by creating provisions that condemn 
                                                            
165 Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 51, 57 (2006).   
166 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 54, art. 2, ¶ 1 
(“For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.”). 
167 de Wet, supra note 165, at 59. 
168 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio 
Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP.  PROBS.  63, 63 (1996) (“International crimes that 
rise to the level of jus cogens constitute obligatio erga omnes which are 
inderogable. Legal obligations which arise from the higher status of such crimes 
include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-applicability of statutes of 
limitations for such crimes, the non-applicability of any immunities up to and 
including Heads of State, the non-applicability of the defense of ‘obedience to 
superior orders’ (save as mitigation of sentence), the universal application of these 
obligations whether in time of peace or war, their non-derogation under ‘states of 
emergency,’ and universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of such crimes.”). 
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violations of human rights.169  At the time of gross violations of 
human rights, such as crimes against humanity that the Nazi 
Germany committed or genocides in Rawanda and Bosnia, such 
condemnation accelerated concretization of prohibitions of acts 
constituting those crimes—committed by either states or persons—
as jus cogens, making the acts punishable under universal 
jurisdiction over criminals.  Today, international law must add to jus 
cogens acts of extreme violence that might result from use of nuclear 
weapons by states or individuals.  In fact, deliberation on the 
underlying legal principle that nudged crimes of genocide, torture, 
and slavery up to the level of jus cogens might reveal that nuclear 
terrorism and its threat have a close kinship with these crimes by 
virtue of similar human rights violations inherent in them and 
humanitarian concerns that they raise.  Nuclear terrorism must also 
be helped rise to the level of jus cogens in the same way. 
Currently, terrorist attacks are considered serious crimes to 
be prosecuted in national courts under domestic laws of the 
prosecuting state.170  Cassese argues that terrorism, when it is 
transnational, state-sponsored, or state-condoned, is an international 
crime and is prohibited by the customary international law.171  This 
Article argues that nuclear terrorism, which is an extreme form of 
terrorism—even when it is not transnational, state-sponsored, or 
state-condoned—falls under the distinct category of non-
international armed conflict.  It must be brought under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC through application of international 
humanitarian laws and by broadening the category of “crimes 
against humanity.”  Doing so comports with the general principles 
of international law concerning fairness and justice, as enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
G. Recommendations for Shift in Law in View of Growing Threat 
of Nuclear Terrorism from Individuals and Groups 
As noted above, ICC’s Final Act did not regard the matters 
to have been finalized beyond possibility of change.  It foresaw 
                                                            
169 de Wet, supra note 165, at 58.  
170  Cassese, supra note 13, at 993.   
171  Id. at 994. 
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expansion of International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction in the 
future—which is now.  It recommended that a future Review 
Conference would forge a definition of terrorist crimes, acceptable 
to the world community, to include heinous acts of terrorism within 
the Court’s jurisdiction.  As pointed out above, a successful follow 
up on this recommendation will subsume egregious acts of terrorism 
within “crimes against humanity.”  Also, as noted above, this 
category of crimes, covered by the ICC’s jurisdiction, already 
includes crimes committed by individuals without any state 
involvement, making this recommended shift in international law to 
be just another small forward step, but one with far-reaching impacts 
to international peace and security.   
Following that step, both individual terrorists and groups can 
be prosecuted by the ICC.  The ICC prosecution of terrorist groups 
can proceed along the path taken by Justice Jackson, the Chief 
United States Prosecutor of the principal Axis war criminals at the 
Nuremberg Trials at the International Military Tribunal following 
World War II.  In his report of June 6, 1945, Justice Jackson laid out 
his plan for prosecuting both organizations and individuals, and that 
plan can be adapted for holding modern terrorist organization 
accountable for nuclear terrorism.  Justice Jackson wrote:  
 
In examining the accused 
organizations in the trial, it is our 
proposal to demonstrate their 
declared and covert objectives, 
methods of recruitment, structure, 
lines of responsibility, and methods 
of effectuating their programs. In this 
trial, important representative 
members will be allowed to defend 
their organizations as well as 
themselves. . . . If in the main trial an 
organization is found to be criminal, 
the second stage will be to identify 
and try before regular military 
tribunals individual members not 
already personally convicted in the 
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principal case. Findings in the main 
trial that an organization is criminal in 
nature will be conclusive in any 
subsequent proceedings against 
individual members. The individual 
member will thereafter be allowed to 
plead only personal defenses or 
extenuating circumstances, such as 
that he joined under duress, and as to 
those defenses he should have the 
burden of proof.172  
 
By adapting this formula in the context of possible nuclear 
terrorism—first finding organizations culpable and then holding 
individuals working for that organization responsible—the ICC 
would be able to prosecute both groups and individuals. It might be 
important to note also that the Justice Jackson prosecution plan was 
limited only to barbarities committed by organizations and 
individuals who had committed them as members of organizations. 
Individuals who had committed barbarities without being part of an 
organization and in their personal capacities were not part of this 
plan.  He wrote, “Our case against the major defendants is concerned 
with the Nazi master plan, not with individual barbarities and 
perversions which occurred independently of any central plan.”173  
In the case of nuclear terrorism, the logistical, technical, and 
financial difficulties, as well as the complexities of large-scale 
ideological perversions that might prompt someone to undertake 
destruction and massacre in such grand scale, might preclude lone-
wolf nuclear terrorism.  Thus, adapting broad outlines of the Justice 
Jackson prosecution plan to nuclear terrorism can be feasible with 
minimal modifications.   
Another recommendation that this Article makes for 
addressing possible nuclear terrorism is to elevate purposefully 
prohibition against such an act to the level of jus cogens.  At this 
                                                            
172 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to President Harry Truman para. 3 
(June 6, 1945) (on file with Yale Law School Library).  
173 Id. para. 4. 
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time, the world community is acutely perceiving this threat, as 
discussed above, and the world opinion is consolidating on the 
seriousness of damage that can result if the threat realizes.  Already, 
a number of international conventions, treaties, and other 
multilateral arrangements are in place to deal with the possibility of 
such a situation.  Already, urgency is being felt to prevent nuclear 
terrorism.  Time is opportune to give this emerging norm against 
possession and use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors and 
groups a nudge to raise it to the level of a peremptory norm of 
international law, from which no derogation is possible. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
International law receives its impetus for and direction of 
evolution from its dual character, as identified by Ku and Diehl: as 
an operating system, it establishes rules and norms that chart out 
outlines of potential interactions; as a normative system, it identifies 
“substantive values and goals” that international actors are to pursue 
in international relations.174  Ku and Diehl’s conception of 
international law as an operating system175 is handy for the purposes 
of the suggestions advanced in the last part of this Article, noted 
above.  
Ku and Diehl regard the international legal system as 
capable of dealing with multiple issues and one that is not only 
engendered of the values and norms that it promotes but also shapes 
its counterpart: international law as a normative system.176  Seen in 
its entirety, as a totality of operating principles and values, 
international law, thus, enshrines an internal dynamic that prods it 
on the path of development so that norms developed in one part of 
international law make themselves available for operational 
purposes in other parts of the law.  This Article has proposed that 
the values embodied in international humanitarian laws must inform 
laws that are meant to protect the world from proliferation and use 
of nuclear weapons by the emerging new non-state individual and 
group actors, national or transnational in scope, meaning to harm 
                                                            
174 Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 4.   
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 5. 
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human security through nuclear terrorism.  This direction of 
evolution is not too far-fetched to foresee: international law in other 
areas, such as human rights laws and humanitarian laws, has already 
brought individuals within its fold.177 
More pertinent for the purposes of this Article is Ku and 
Diehl’s comment that, in the traditional way, international law 
undergoes normative shift as customary practices evolve.178  A 
normative shift can, however, also be purposefully and actively 
brought about.  Recently, new treaties, including the NPT, have been 
used to bring about normative shift when such a need arose.179  The 
treaty on nuclear non-proliferation was concluded when the power 
of the atom was discovered and its enormous potential for both 
peaceful and destructive purposes was understood and need was felt 
to both promote its peaceful purposes and restrict its use for 
destructive purposes.  Today, the NPT needs a second normative 
shift.  The NPT, as concluded, did not foresee the emergence of 
catastrophic terrorism in a new world order where the danger of 
proliferation and use of nuclear weapons will arise from non-state 
groups and individuals seeking to end the world or inflict extreme 
violence on adversaries.180  The NPT can be revised to incorporate 
the new reality.  It can be revised by incorporating principles 
emerging from other areas of laws or by helping advance the idea of 
nuclear non-proliferation to the level of jus cogens such that the state 
consent requirement of international law is not a bar against 
prosecution of nuclear terrorists. 
 At the risk of belaboring the point, it may be pertinent to 
apply ideas from Franck’s classic book Fairness in International 
Law and Institutions to the subject matter of this Article. Franck 
noted early in the book that in international law’s post-ontological 
stage in the late twentieth century, when the number and functions 
of international organizations hiked, the proper inquiry is not 
                                                            
177 Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 6. 
178 Id. at 14. 
179 Id. at 1. 
180 Paul I. Bernstein et al., The Future Nuclear Landscape, 5 NAT’L DEF. 
U. (Apr. 2007), 
https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Occasional%20P
apers/05_The%20Future%20Nuclear%20Landscape.pdf. 
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whether international law is law but whether it is fair and 
effective.181  Fairness in laws for Franck is composed of legitimacy 
and distributive justice, the former being a function of mechanisms 
that guarantee fair procedures and the latter being a function of the 
value and worth of laws in allocating appropriate burdens and 
benefits.  Legitimacy in rules seeks to preserve order, and 
distributive justice in rules favors change.  Through the tension 
between order and change, societies seek fairness.182  Legal systems 
are judged by their consequences, in which both procedure and 
substance matter.  Franck’s fairness thesis develops further as he 
points out that the tension between legitimacy and justice—or order 
and change—is impacted by the concept of equity in international 
law.183  When equity is employed to create an exception to the rule 
when a strict application of the rule might result in unfairness or 
injustice, a certain level of rule indeterminacy results, or rule 
legitimacy is lowered.  On the one hand, a certain level of rule 
indeterminacy is to be expected in all bodies of law as it helps arrive 
at agreements and achieve flexibility.184  On the other hand, rule 
indeterminacy can help justify non-compliance.185  A determinate or 
inflexible rule can also lose legitimacy if its application brings about 
an unjust result.186  Calling such rules as “idiot rules”—as opposed 
to “sophist rules,” highly flexible rules—Franck writes:  
 
[Highly determinate or inflexible 
rules] sometimes tend to be 
unsophisticated in their lack of fine-
tuning and are then likely to be 
perceived—at their margins—as 
                                                            
181 FRANCK, supra note 81, at 6. 
182 Id. at 22–24. 
183 Id. at 33–34, 49. 
184 Id. at 31. 
185 Id. 
186 Giving several examples from modern international relations, Franck 
wrote: “In such cases ‘hard and fast’ rules of apportionment can be applied at the 
risk of achieving results which lead to moral outrage and law’s reductio ad 
absurdum.  In that sense, fairness discourse which aims to temper the imperative 
of legitimacy with that of justice serves not to undermine but to redeem the law.” 
Id. at 79. 
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unreasonable and illegitimate in their 
demands. If a patently absurd or unfair 
result accrues from the only possible 
application of the evident meaning of 
a simple rule in circumstances 
requiring a more calibrated response, 
then that rule has suffered reductio ad 
absurdum, a condition which even 
may undermine its legitimacy in 
circumstances not at its margins.187 
 
In Franck’s terms, international laws’ inability to punish non-state 
actors even if they commit nuclear terrorism and devastate life arises 
out of excessive high level of determinacy, or inflexibility, of the 
rules.  Pertinent to this Article are the laws that hold perpetrators of 
certain acts, falling under the category of “crimes against 
humanity,” culpable under international law and punishable under 
the ICC jurisdiction, but are rendered impotent against nuclear 
terrorists.  The patent unfairness of the outcome, or ineffectiveness 
of the application, of these rules to respond to a new, worrisome 
situation of the emerging threat of nuclear terrorism, can be 
mitigated by application of equity in one of the forms defined and 
explained by Franck.  In this situation, equity must take the form of 
extending ICC’s jurisdiction of nuclear terrorism, not merely by 
characterizing nuclear terrorism as a crime against humanity but by 
acting, even when such characterization or definition is hard to 
formulate, under the general international law principles that 
underlie the prohibition of such acts.  Article 1(1) of the U.N. 
Charter is a conspicuously-relevant international legal provision 
under whose legal authority international institutions’ jurisdiction 
can be established over possible nuclear terrorists.188   Further, the 
                                                            
187 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 
77 (1990). 
188 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1 (“To maintain international peace and security, 
and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
57
IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/19  8:23 PM 
58 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:1 
U.N. Charter’s emphasis on international peace and security, whose 
breach triggers the U.N. Security Council into action under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter, should be brought to bear upon acts or 
threats of nuclear terrorism.  Even further, normative aspect of the 
concept of nuclear non-proliferation must be explicitly embedded in 
a large number of key international instruments and multilateral 
treaties in the hope of advancing the concept the level of jus cogens 
from which derogation might not become possible.  
The current international legal regime of nuclear non-
proliferation does not apply to non-state actors.  The fear has risen 
that they may acquire and use nuclear weapons to perpetrate nuclear 
terrorism.  The direction of change that this Article suggests will 
strengthen international law’s reach over possible nuclear terrorists.  
Placing the crime under the ICC jurisdiction and/or prompting the 
emergence of peremptory norms against nuclear proliferation and 
incorporating them in the existing regime of nuclear 
nonproliferation with strengthen the international system against 
nuclear proliferation and use by terrorists. 
                                                            
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace.”). 
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